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Abstract 
In this study we examine the relationship between objective and subjective dimensions of social 
integration and the size and the heterogeneity of egocentric network using nationally 
representative databases from Hungary. On the one hand, we define social integration with its 
‘objective’ dimensions:  a high level of trust and a high level of public participation. On the other 
hand, we analyse the ‘subjective’ or perceived component of integration as well, which is based 
on individuals’ self-evaluation of whether they are integrated or not. Subjective integration has 
two sides: external, which refers to the perception that someone feels that she is a respected 
part of society, and internal which means that she feels that she is recognised for being the 
person she is. 
Our results show that while the size and heterogeneity of the egocentric network associate 
positively, the proportion of relatives among strong ties correlates negatively with objective 
indicators of social integration. The heterogeneity of weak ties is related positively to public 
participation. The correlation between the size and composition of egocentric networks and 
subjective integration is less clear: the proportion of relatives among strong ties seems to be 
unrelated to the external side of perceived social integration, while it is associated positively 
with the internal side of subjective integration. The number of strong ties seems to be positively 
correlated with both sides of subjective integration.  
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These results suggest that higher level of social integration cannot be achieved without 
concentrating on more than one of its dimensions. They also underline the need to pay more 
attention to network characteristics and social support not only regarding perceived social 
integration, but also regarding objective indicators of social integration. 
Keywords: egocentric network, social integration, trust, participation,  
1. Introduction 
Social ties and social networks are usually regarded as terms equivalent to social integration 2. 
Papers handle the lack of ties as an obvious sign of disintegration or segregation 3, however, it 
is also obvious that for a better understanding of integration, the examination of having or 
lacking relations is not sufficient. As part of a more sophisticated approach, we state that the 
structure and size of egocentric networks matters as well. First, individuals with ties to different 
social groups can access more information, thus they treat uncertainty and crisis in their lives 
(e.g. unemployment) better 4. Also they are more likely to have contact with members of higher 
strata, which might raise the chance of their mobility 5. Second, it seems to be an advantage if 
someone has weak and strong ties6. Strong ties have an important role in social support and 
provide economic and mental stability 7, whereas weak ties are more important in the effective 
mobilization of resources 8. In sum, a person is regarded as well integrated if she has ties that 
are heterogeneous and consist of both weak and strong ties.9 
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Although the terms connected to social ties and social networks are used interchangeably with 
social integration, it may be argued that ‘social integration’ is more than only having social ties: 
solidarity, commitment, belonging, trust and public participation are also important dimensions 
to take into account. This interpretation is closely related to the term ‘social cohesion’, but 
whereas social cohesion denotes a collective quality, social integration is able – in this 
interpretation – to capture the quality and strength of the individual's ties to society.10 For 
example, O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett 11 propose a definition of social integration as “attraction 
to the group, satisfaction with other members of the group, and social interaction among the 
group members”. This definition goes beyond the social ties perspective. To sum up, in this 
paper we define social integration with three dimensions: social ties (strong ties and weak ties), 
trust (generalised trust or trust in other people and confidence in institutions) and public (civil 
and political) participation. 
These factors  can be called the ‘objective’ dimensions of social integration since social scientists 
and policy makers decide which aspects are most important regardless of the individual’s own 
feelings or own evaluation of being integrated. Thus, as another dimension of integration, 
namely ‘subjective’ or perceived social integration must also be taken into account.  
The subjective evaluation of social integration is captured through the individual’s perception of 
her own safety and how she perceives herself as an important member of society. This approach 
is beneficial because it is able to take into account the diversity of opinions about  the important 
aspects of social integration 12. Subjective integration means, on the one hand, that someone 
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feels that she is part of society, she has a particular role in it, or her opinion is respected (and at 
least partially shared) by others. This could be called the collective or ‘external’ side of perceived 
social integration. On the other hand, being integrated also means that someone feels safe and 
supported by her kin and her close friends, she feels that she or what she does is accepted by 
others, and that she is recognised for being the person she is. This could be called the ‘internal’ 
side of perceived social integration.  
This multi-dimensional nature of social integration allows relations between its components to 
be examined. This approach is closely related to Banfield’s 13 work. Examining a small town in 
SouthernItaly, characterized by low public participation, low economic growth and networks 
centred on the family, Banfield describes the phenomenon of amoral familism.  He shows that 
“in a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interest of the group or community 
except as it is to his private advantage to do so” 14. Amoral familism may be seen as a special 
social condition 15 in which general trust is low, political and social participation is weak, and 
individuals follow their self-interest instead of the community’s and they assume that others act 
the same way.  In such societies, kin relationships are extremely strong, trust in relatives is high, 
whereas trust in any other member of society is very low.   
When trust – either trust in fellow citizens or confidence in institutions – is low, people assume 
that others do not share their values and beliefs, people do not expect cooperation from others, 
consequently, they follow their own self-interests 16. Trust and confidence are extremely 
important to engage in any type of participation: when generalised trust is high, people might 
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think that others would participate as well, thus the costs and risks of participation would 
decrease. In a society characterised by low trust, perceived costs and risks are high, therefore 
people tend to stay passive.  Furthermore, without the belief that institutions will respond to 
our efforts to express opinions or to find solutions to common problems, political participation 
seems superfluous 17.  
Based on Banfield 18, in this paper we examine how social ties (the size and the heterogeneity of 
egocentric network) are associated with the other two objective dimensions (trust and public 
participation) and the subjective dimension of social integration, using nationally representative 
Hungarian survey data. 
The association between characteristics of egocentric networks and ‘objective’ dimensions of 
integration is supposed to be mostly positive: the larger and the more heterogeneous the 
individuals’ networks are the more trusting, confident or active they will be. Since strong ties 
are expressive, and multi-functional relations connecting us to our family and close friends, they 
are supposed to increase the level of perceived social integration as well. On the other hand, 
these strong ties might have some less favourable characteristics: they are highly influenced by 
the “like me” principle 19, meaning that someone makes close friends with similar others. Thus, 
one might feel well-integrated when her close egocentric network is homogenous, but as 
demonstrated by Banfield’s Southern Italian town, this homogeneous network might be 
negatively related to public participation and trust, i.e. to the objective dimensions of social 
integration.  
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Our paper contributes to the literature by pointing out that association between dimensions of 
social integration might vary, and individuals might be characterised by a high level of social 
integration in one dimension, while by a lower level of integration in another dimension. Using 
data from Hungary provides novel answers to the research question since countries in this 
Central-Eastern-European region have below-average levels of trust in people and in 
institutions, below-average public participation and have weak scores on social networks 
indicators 20. Although people are not well integrated “objectively”, they might feel that they 
are relatively well-integrated “subjectively” because in their close circles they are respected, 
they feel safe and supported by their kin and close friends. This might be the process that 
maintains the relatively low level of social integration in Hungary (and in Eastern-Europe in 
general).   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the summary of the previous literature 
and our hypothesis. The next section describes the data and the estimation methods we used. 
Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature and hypotheses 
In the following section, we briefly discuss the main research results and literature about the 
relationship between the structure of egocentric networks and other objective and subjective 
dimensions of social integration. Based on this literature, we formulate our hypotheses. 
Egocentric networks and trust 
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Dense networks play a crucial role in creating social cohesion and high level of trust 21. According 
to Coleman 22, dense networks are important to make decisions about the trustworthiness of 
others: when direct information is not available about a person’s trustworthiness, the only 
possible source of information is the opinion provided by this person’s acquaintances. 
Furthermore, when everybody knows each other in a group, interpersonal ties and mutual 
commitments might increase trust and decrease non-cooperative behaviour.  On the other 
hand, excessively dense networks might lead to distrust and suspicion among members of the 
network by over-controlling individuals’ life. Obligations of reciprocity and sharing resources are 
closing these networks further and cause the formation of non-transparent networks, where - 
as in Banfield’s theory – people outside these networks might become a threat to members 23. 
Besides density, the heterogeneity of ties might be important as well: in a heterogeneous 
environment, intergroup conflicts are less likely to emerge 24. According to experimental 
research, direct interactions among individuals are reliable predictors of mutual trust 25.   
Egocentric networks and participation 
The size of egocentric network correlates positively with various forms of public participation 26. 
Angelusz and Tardos 27 identify this phenomenon in national and local election participation. 
Moreover, many argue that the correlation between network size and public participation is even 
stronger in the case of participation in civil organizations and other, extra-parliamentary forms, 
as signing a petition or participation in a demonstration 28. However, it is important to emphasise 
that the direction of the causality is not clear. On the one hand, it is possible that participation 
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contributes to the maintenance of a larger network. On the other hand, it is also possible that it 
is easier to make people with more acquaintances get involved in the work of associations and 
other forms of participation.  
The relationship between heterogeneity of the egocentric network and participation is less clear. 
From a democratic participation point of view, building heterogeneous networks is desirable, 
since it implies that people from different strata and social groups are able to discuss public 
issues. However, the “like me” principle 29 and other factors are working against this desirable 
state. Some research suggests that heterogeneous egocentric networks decrease the probability 
of electoral participation 30. Mutz 31 argues that various opinions might lead to uncertainty,  
whereas according to Noelle-Neumann 32 in an environment with many opinions differing from 
the individual’s, she might feel that she differs from the dominant norms of her social circles. 
Finally, Coleman 33 argues that closed groups are able to provide the social support necessary to 
increase electoral participation.  
The classic assumption about civil associations is that they create cross-cutting ties among social 
groups.34 However, other studies find that membership in civil associations is a way of creating 
social capital, thus people from higher strata form associations with people from a similar social 
background rather than with others of lower social status 35. This does not rule out the possibility 
that members of civil associations are able to create ties with people of a different social status, 
but the efforts to create connections within these associations might decrease the chances to 
make and maintain other connections outside these associations.  
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Research on Hungarian associations has shown that people participating in associations are  
quite a homogenous group. They tend to be similar to each other and differ from others who do 
not participate, a finding that might support the claim that associations strengthen homogenous 
ties 36.  Other studies examining primarily weak ties have found positive correlations between 
civil participation and the heterogeneity of weak ties 37. 
Egocentric networks and subjective integration 
People having closed networks might feel safer since strong ties provide not only material goods 
and instrumental help, but strengthen opinions and provide psychical and emotional support 38. 
Strong ties are often born from the “like me” principle: people like to choose friends from people 
similar to them 39. Moreover, strong ties are often transitive, which means that the ego’s two 
close contacts are more likely to get to know each other than the ego’s two other acquaintances 
connected by weak ties to the ego 40. If the “like me” principle is working, the ego’s two close 
friends will be similar not only to the ego but to each other as well. Thus, the tie between them 
is also more likely to be strong, which results in closed, homogenous networks. Members of 
these networks will have continuous support from each other, strengthening the network even 
more, and making new ties to people outside these networks less likely to form.41  
Although the literature mostly stresses mechanisms based on similarity and affection, in creating 
networks, mechanisms based on repulsion are also important. Skvoretz 42 argues that 
homogenous groups might be formed not only by the selection of similar people but also by 
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keeping a distance from certain groups. This might be especially important in the evolution of 
territorial segregation.  
We assume that whether homogenous networks are formed by affection or repulsion, they 
certainly strengthen the feeling of safety. If the network is based on affection, the main cause is 
strong social support, whereas if it is based on repulsion, the main cause might be having 
negative images, negative expectations and fear of others. On the other hand, the external side 
of perceived social integration might depend more on the higher heterogeneity of an egocentric 
network since feeling an important part of society might require positive feedback from people 
with various status and various social backgrounds. 
Based on the reviewed literature, it seems that the size of the egocentric network and its 
composition (its heterogeneity or homogeneity) affect social integration. Thus we formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
H1.  The size of an egocentric network is positively correlated with other dimensions of social 
integration.  
H2. If egocentric networks are composed mostly of kin-relations, the level of trust and public 
participation might be lower. In other words, the heterogeneity of the network might be 
positively correlated with trust and public participation.  
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H3. If egocentric networks are composed mostly of kin-relations (i.e. the heterogeneity of an 
egocentric network is small), the level of perceived internal social integration might be higher, 
whereas the level of perceived external social integration might be lower.  
3. Data and methods 
We used data from the Hungarian Election Study for the year 200843 and the European Quality 
of Life Survey second wave (2007)44. 
The Hungarian Election Study contains data for 3100 individuals and is representative for the 
adult population of Hungary. Since egocentric network questions were asked only from two 
thirds of the sample, our initial sample size was 2120. The questionnaire asked respondents 
about their membership in voluntary organisations, political participation, voting behaviour and 
confidence in institutions. Using these questions, we had three indicators for the first 
component of social integration (trust) and two indicators for the second component of social 
integration (public participation). 
Our first indicator of social integration was membership in voluntary organisations. Respondents 
were asked if they were members of each of ten types of voluntary organizations (e.g. sports 
club, professional association, charity organization and trade union). This indicator measures if 
the respondent is a member in at least one voluntary organisation. 
Our second indicator was participation in political activities. Respondents were asked if they 
participated in any of 13 political activities in the previous few years. The scope of these activities 
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was broad: the list included activities from working in a political party or action group over taking 
part in a lawful public demonstration to voting via SMS in a television show.45 The variable of 
participation in political activities indicates whether the respondents participated in any of the 
13 political activities. The third indicator is also related to political activity: it measures if 
respondents voted in the last general election preceding the survey. 
The fourth and fifth indicators of social integration were confidence in governmental and non-
governmental institutions, respectively. Respondents were asked how much they trust eight 
governmental (government, courts, parliament, constitutional court, army, president, police, 
and local governments) and four non-governmental (churches, political parties, trade unions, 
and NGOs) institutions on a 4-point scale. Variables of confidence in governmental and non-
governmental institutions are calculated as the mean of these 8 and 4 answers.46 
The number of strong ties was measured with the name generator approach. Respondents were 
asked to name people with whom they share three particular types of social relations (discussing 
intimate and personal matters; going out together; getting help with everyday tasks). They could 
list up tofive people in each of the three situations (altogether maximum 15 people), and they 
were asked to indicate the type of relationship these people had to them (e.g. 
husband/wife/partner, son/daughter, parent, other relative, friend, colleague etc.). The number 
of strong ties is calculated as the number of people listed in these three questions. We have also 
been able to calculate the proportion of relatives among strong ties as an indicator of 
heterogeneity of strong ties.  
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The number of weak ties was measured with the position generator technique. It measured a 
respondent’s relationships to particular types of alters. Respondents were asked to indicate 
whether or not they have a contact with anyone in particular occupations (e.g.  high school 
teacher, engineer, skilled worker, waiter/waitress – altogether 22 occupations). The number of 
weak ties is calculated as the number of occupations the respondents had contact with. The 
heterogeneity of weak ties is measured as the variance of the prestige scores (from the 
Treiman's Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale) of the occupations the 
respondents had contact with.  
The Hungarian data of the second wave (2007) of the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) 
contains data for 1000 individuals and it is representative for the adult persons living in private 
households. This questionnaire included questions about subjective social integration. 
Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed on a 5-point scale with four 
statements regarding perceived social exclusion. 
1) I feel left out of society. 
2) Some people look down on me because of my job situation or income. 
3) I don’t feel the value of what I do is recognised by others. 
High values of the variables reflect disagreements with the statements, i.e. they reflect 
perceived social integration (or lack of social exclusion or low social exclusion). It has to be noted 
that these variables do not measure the external and internal sides of perceived social 
integration to the same degree. Specifically, the first variable reflects mostly the external side 
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of integration, since the statement refers to the whole society. The second statement also refers 
to society, but in a functional or stratification-related way, as it connects integration to 
occupation and income. On the other hand, the third variable is assumed to measure the 
support and recognition of others, or in other words, it concentrates more on the emotional 
side of integration. To sum up, from statement 1 to statement 3, the three questions measure 
the internal side of perceived integration increasingly, whereas from statement 1 to statement 
3, they measure the external side decreasingly. 
The EQLS questionnaire lacked the standard measures of egocentric networks (i.e. the position 
generator or name generator). The number of strong ties is captured using a question asking 
respondents who they would get support from in five situations47. They had to choose the most 
important person in each situation, indicating if this person was their partner/spouse, other 
family member, colleague, friend, neighbour or someone else. The number of strong ties is 
calculated as the number of situations respondents could get support in. The proportion of 
relatives among strong ties is calculated as the share of naming partner/spouse, or other family 
members in these situations. It has to be noted that this measure is far from ideal, since 
respondents were able to name only one person in each situation, thus in most situations they 
named a relative. Moreover, the questions about strong ties measure the availability of strong 
ties in different areas instead of their absolute number. Thus, as we noted above, the variables 
can be regarded only as proxy measures of the number and heterogeneity of strong ties. 
Questions for weak ties were lacking in the questionnaire. 
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We estimated a linear relationship between the size and the heterogeneity of egocentric 
networks and the indicators of social integration using OLS models.48 The estimated model 
regarding data from the Hungarian Election Study is the following:  
ii
WT
i
WT
i
ST
i
ST
ii HNRNSI   X543210 , 
where iSI  is the indicator of social integration, 
ST
iN  is the number of strong ties
49, STiR is the 
proportion of relatives among strong ties50, WTiN  is the number of weak ties, 
WT
iH  heterogeneity 
of weak ties, iX  is the vector of personal characteristics of the individual
51. Finally, the equation 
includes the usual error term ( i ).
52 
The estimated model regarding data from the European Quality of Life Survey is the following:  
ii
ST
i
ST
ii RNSI   X3210 , 
where iSI  is the indicator of social integration, 
ST
iN  is the number of strong ties, 
ST
iR is the 
proportion of relatives among strong ties53, iX  is the vector of personal characteristics of the 
individual 54, i  is the error term.
55 
4. Results 
Table 1 and Table 2 show the results for objective and subjective indicators of social integration, 
respectively. Dependent variables of Columns 1-3 in Table 1 are variables of public participation 
(membership in voluntary organizations, participation in political activities and voting in the last 
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general election, respectively). The numbers of strong and weak ties are mostly positively 
related to variables of public participation – the one exception is voting in the last general 
election, which is determined more by socio-demographic variables. Compared to having no 
strong ties, having 7 or more strong ties correlates with a higher likelihood of membership in 
voluntary organisations, whereas having 1-6 strong ties makes statistically no difference in the 
likelihood of membership. On the other hand, having one strong tie is associated with a 14.2 
percentage point higher likelihood of participation in political activities compared to having no 
strong tie,  having even more than one strong tie is associated with a linearly increasing 
likelihood of political activities. A one standard deviation increase in the number of weak ties is 
associated with a 6.0 percentage point increase in membership in voluntary organizations, and 
with a 5.5 percentage point increase in participation in political activities. This means that 
individuals with larger egocentric networks are more likely to participate in public life than 
people with smaller egocentric networks. Regarding voting, the estimated coefficient on the 
number of weak ties is not statistically significant, whereas the effect of the number of strong 
ties is non-linear. Those with no strong ties voted with the highest likelihood in the last general 
election. Compared to them, those with one strong tie were 11.3 percentage point less likely to 
have voted. Those with more strong ties voted with statistically no different likelihood, i.e. the 
relationship between the number of strong ties and voting seems to show a U-shape. 
Heterogeneity of weak ties correlates positively with two of the three variables of participation. 
A one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity of weak ties is associated with a 2.2 
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percentage point increase in membership in voluntary organizations, and with a 3.6 percentage 
point increase in participation in political activities. The results corroborate the findings using 
American (Magee, 2008) and Japanese data (Miyata et al, 2008). As noted above, these results 
do not indicate any direction of causality. It is possible that public participation strengthens the 
connections between different groups of society, while it is also possible that a heterogeneous 
network provides the basis of acquiring communication skills necessary in public participation.  
According to our hypothesis, the higher the proportion of relatives among strong ties the less 
likely the membership in voluntary organisations, and the less likely the participation in political 
activities. A one standard deviation increase in the proportion of relatives is associated with a 
2.5 percentage point decrease in voluntary organisation membership and 5.4 percentage point 
decrease in political activities. On the other hand, its association with voting in the last general 
election is insignificant. 
These results might be explained by the different nature of the three types of public 
participation. Participation in voluntary organisations and participation in political activities 
require persistent cooperation with others, whereas voting in an election is a single event, where 
an individual acts alone. According to Banfield 56, those who have strong ties mostly in their 
family trust  other people less and are less likely to cooperate  with others, which might explain 
the negative coefficients for the first two indicators and the insignificant coefficient for voting.57 
On the other hand, the elderly are more likely to vote in general elections than the young, 
whereas they have smaller networks as well, thus the correlation between network size, the 
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heterogeneity of the egocentric network and voting is rather weak. It is also possible that voting 
is a more or less ritual or routine event, thus it depends less on social contacts and network 
characteristics. 
 
Table 1: OLS regression coefficients for indicators of social integration  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Membership in 
voluntary 
organisations 
(NGOs) 
Participation in 
political 
activities 
Voted in the 
last general 
election 
Confidence in 
governmental 
institutions 
Confidence in 
non-
governmental 
institutions 
Number of strong 
ties: 0 
ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
1 0.015 0.142*** -0.113* 0.133* 0.148* 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.075) (0.085) 
2-3 0.048 0.149*** -0.049 0.189*** 0.194** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.067) (0.077) 
4-6 0.033 0.192*** -0.049 0.209*** 0.175** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.066) (0.076) 
7+ 0.143** 0.237*** -0.069 0.163* 0.188* 
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.065) (0.088) (0.100) 
Proportion of 
relatives among 
strong ties 
-0.001** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of weak 
ties 
0.012*** 0.011*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Heterogeneity of 
weak ties  
0.001** 0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.118 0.100 0.069 0.058 
N 2053 2053 2028 2039 1978 
Data from Hungarian Election Study 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables: age, 
squared age, sex, marital status, education, labour force status, subjective social class, activity limitation, 
household size, per capita household income, type of settlement and region. Dummies are included for 
missing income variable. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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In the case of confidence in governmental and confidence in non-governmental institutions 
(Column 4 and Column 5 in Table 1), regarding strong ties, the results are similar: the number of 
strong ties correlates positively with the type of confidence in institutions. The real difference 
appears to be firstly between those who have no strong ties and who have some strong ties (at 
least 0.13-0.15 point higher trust compared to the former group), and secondly between those 
who have one strong tie and those who have two or more strong ties (0.04-0.08 point higher 
trust compared to the former group).  
The proportion of relatives among strong ties correlates negatively with both trust variables. A 
one standard deviation increase in proportion of relatives among strong ties is associated with 
a 1.4 percentage decrease in confidence in governmental organisations, and with a 2.0 
percentage decrease in confidence in non-governmental organisations. The number and 
heterogeneity of weak ties seems to be unrelated to confidence in institutions. 
Table 2 shows the results for models where the dependent variable is perceived (subjective) 
social integration. The dependent variable of model 1 is that the respondent feels left out of 
society, the dependent variable of model 2 is that the respondent feels that some people look 
down on her because of her job situation or income, and the dependent variable of model 3 is 
that the respondent does not feel that what she does is recognised by others. As we noted 
above, these statements reflect increasingly the internal side of perceived integration (and 
decreasingly its external side). 
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The coefficient on the number of strong ties is positive and significant in all the three models, 
which means that the higher the egocentric network the more integrated individuals see 
themselves – regardless of the degree of the internal and the external side of integration. The 
estimated coefficient on the proportion of relatives among strong ties is insignificant in model 1 
and model 2, whereas it is positive and significant in model 3. It is worth noting that the size of 
the coefficient is increasing as the dependent variable reflected increasingly the internal side of 
subjective integration (0.013, 0.200, 0.452 in model 1, model 2 and model 3, respectively). These 
results could be interpreted as suggesting that the proportion of relatives in the egocentric 
network is positively related to the internal side of perceived social integration, but it does not 
seem to be correlated with its external side. However, we have to note again that the measure 
of egocentric networks in the EQLS questionnaire is far from ideal and as the questionnaire 
lacked questions on weak ties, we were unable to include these variables in our models. Hence, 
the results are only indicative and we must be careful when drawing strong conclusions from 
them. 
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Table 2: OLS regression coefficients for indicators of perceived social integration 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Being left out of 
society (disagreement) 
Feeling that some 
people look down on 
her (disagreement) 
Feeling that her value 
is not recognised by 
others (disagreement) 
Number of strong ties 0.086* 0.097* 0.101* 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.053) 
Proportion of relatives among 
strong ties 
0.021 0.224 0.472*** 
 (0.150) (0.175) (0.173) 
r2_a 0.133 0.177 0.075 
N 951 927 900 
Data from European Quality of Life Survey 2007. Standard errors are in parentheses. High values of the 
dependent variables reflect disagreement with the statements (high level of perceived social integration). 
Control variables: age, squared age, sex, marital status, education, labour force status, health problem, 
subjective financial situation, household size, per capita household income, type of settlement, and 
region. Dummies are included for missing income variable. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Hypothesis 1 seems to be supported by our results. A higher number of strong ties is associated 
with better social integration according to both objective and subjective indicators. The number 
of weak ties, however, correlates positively only with membership in NGOs and participation in 
political activities, with those two types of activities that require more or less persistent 
cooperation with others.  
Hypothesis 2 is also mostly supported by our results. The proportion of relatives among strong 
ties correlates negatively with four of the five objective indicators of social integration, whereas 
the heterogeneity of weak ties correlates positively with indicators of public participation, but it 
is not related to voting and confidence in institutions. Overall, it seems that the heterogeneity 
of the egocentric network is positively related to being well-integrated. 
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The results do not falsify hypothesis H3 either. The proportion of relatives among strong ties 
seems to be positively related to the internal side of perceived social integration, whereas it is 
not correlated with indicators of subjective integration measuring mostly the external side of 
social integration. Thus, we may conclude that egocentric networks composed mostly of 
relatives are beneficial regarding feeling safe and being supported by others (internal side of 
perceived social integration), whereas it has no negative impact on the external side of 
subjective integration. However, the lack of correlation might be caused by the question design 
in EQLS, in which the availability of kin in different situations is measured more than their 
proportion in the egocentric networks.  
5. Summary 
In this paper, we have analysed the association between the size and heterogeneity of 
egocentric networks and objective and subjective indicators of social integration, using 
nationally representative databases from Hungary.  
Our results show that the size and heterogeneity of the egocentric network associates positively 
with objective indicators of social integration (public participation and confidence in 
institutions). The number of strong and weak ties correlates positively with objective indicators 
of social integration, whereas the higher the proportion of relatives among strong ties is the less 
likely it is that an individual participates in public activities, and the less likely she is to trust 
institutions. Heterogeneity of weak ties is related positively to public participation. On the other 
hand, due to lack of good-quality secondary data regarding the subjective indicator of social 
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integration, our results are less clear. The proportion of relatives among strong ties seems to 
correlate positively with the internal side of perceived social integration, but it seems to be 
unrelated to its external side. The number of strong ties is associated positively with both the 
internal and external sides of subjective integration. 
Due to data limitation, we were unable to test whether the effects of the number and 
heterogeneity of strong ties on perceived social integration remain unchanged if the number 
and heterogeneity of weak ties are also included in the models. It is possible that the effect of 
the heterogeneity of weak ties is the inverse of those of heterogeneity of strong ties, i.e. the 
heterogeneity of weak ties might be positively related to the external side of subjective 
integration. Further research is needed to answer this question. 
These results suggest that the multi-dimensional nature of social integration cannot be 
neglected, drawing attention to the fact that higher level of social integration cannot be 
achieved concentrating only one of its dimensions. Our results also underline that homogeneous 
egocentric networks are not beneficial regarding trust and participation, however they might 
have a positive effect on feeling safe, supported and recognized by others for being the person 
an individual is.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics, Hungarian Election Study 2008 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Membership in voluntary organisations (NGOs) 0.204 0.403 0 1 2119 
Participation in political activities 0.255 0.436 0 1 2119 
Voted in the last general election 0.759 0.428 0 1 2091 
Trust in governmental institutions 2.518 0.565 1 4 2101 
Trust in non-governmental institutions 2.200 0.609 1 4 2036 
0 strong tie 0.046 0.209 0 1 2120 
1 strong tie 0.169 0.375 0 1 2120 
2-3 strong ties 0.392 0.488 0 1 2120 
4-6 strong ties 0.349 0.477 0 1 2120 
7 or more strong ties 0.044 0.204 0 1 2120 
Proportion of relatives among strong ties (%) 70.908 33.580 0 100 2116 
Number of weak ties 11.192 5.182 0 24 2108 
Heterogeneity of weak ties 47.195 20.329 0 154.3 2108 
Age 47.855 17.899 18 96 2112 
Sex 1.542 0.498 1 2 2120 
Single 0.243 0.429 0 1 2116 
Married/living with partner 0.533 0.499 0 1 2116 
Separated 0.096 0.295 0 1 2116 
Widowed 0.128 0.334 0 1 2116 
Education: Primary 0.244 0.430 0 1 2116 
Education: Vocational 0.320 0.466 0 1 2116 
Education: Secondary 0.299 0.458 0 1 2116 
Education: Tertiary 0.138 0.345 0 1 2116 
Budapest 0.168 0.374 0 1 2120 
County seat 0.213 0.409 0 1 2120 
Town 0.285 0.452 0 1 2120 
Village 0.334 0.472 0 1 2120 
Employed/self-employed 0.510 0.500 0 1 2111 
Retired 0.330 0.470 0 1 2111 
Unemployed 0.048 0.214 0 1 2111 
In education 0.064 0.244 0 1 2111 
Other 0.048 0.213 0 1 2111 
Activity limitation 0.241 0.428 0 1 2110 
Subjective social class: upper class 0.022 0.146 0 1 2094 
Subjective social class: middle class 0.403 0.491 0 1 2094 
Subjective social class: lower middle class 0.262 0.440 0 1 2094 
Subjective social class: lower and working classes 0.313 0.464 0 1 2094 
Household size 2.803 1.236 1 5 2118 
Per capita household income (HUF) 73971 70097 6000 1000000 1219 
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Central Hungary region 0.254 0.435 0 1 2120 
Central Transdanubia region 0.123 0.328 0 1 2120 
Western Transdanubia region 0.106 0.309 0 1 2120 
Southern Transdanubia region 0.104 0.306 0 1 2120 
Northern Hungary region 0.127 0.333 0 1 2120 
Northern Great Plain region 0.155 0.362 0 1 2120 
Southern Great Plain region 0.131 0.337 0 1 2120 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics, European Quality of Life Survey 2. wave 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
I feel left out of society 4.071 1.021 1 5 987 
Some people look down on me because of my job 
situation or income 
3.793 1.170 1 5 964 
I don’t feel the value of what I do is recognised by 
others 
3.366 1.113 1 5 936 
Number of strong ties 4.314 0.887 0 5 1000 
Proportion of relatives among strong ties (%) 0.789 0.274 0 1 1000 
Sex 0.536 0.499 0 1 1000 
Age 46.479 17.694 18 95 1000 
Education: Primary 0.553 0.497 0 1 1000 
Education: Secondary 0.332 0.471 0 1 1000 
Education: Tertiary 0.115 0.319 0 1 1000 
Living with partner 0.620 0.486 0 1 993 
Separated 0.088 0.283 0 1 993 
Widowed 0.110 0.312 0 1 993 
Single 0.183 0.387 0 1 993 
Employed/self-employed 0.457 0.498 0 1 1000 
Retired 0.315 0.465 0 1 1000 
Unemployed 0.075 0.264 0 1 1000 
In education 0.058 0.234 0 1 1000 
Other 0.095 0.293 0 1 1000 
Health problem 0.287 0.452 0 1 976 
HH makes ends meet: easily 0.254 0.436 0 1 992 
HH makes ends meet: with some difficulty 0.379 0.485 0 1 992 
HH makes ends meet: with difficulty 0.206 0.405 0 1 992 
HH makes ends meet: with great difficulty 0.161 0.367 0 1 992 
Household size 2.976 1.247 1 5 1000 
Per capita household income (EUR) 248.3 190.8 13 2362.3 742 
Village 0.535 0.499 0 1 999 
Town 0.280 0.449 0 1 999 
Budapest 0.185 0.388 0 1 999 
Central Hungary region 0.289 0.454 0 1 1000 
Central Transdanubia region 0.124 0.330 0 1 1000 
Western Transdanubia region 0.147 0.354 0 1 1000 
Southern Transdanubia region 0.134 0.341 0 1 1000 
Northern Hungary region 0.097 0.296 0 1 1000 
Northern Great Plain region 0.099 0.299 0 1 1000 
Southeast Great Plain region 0.109 0.312 0 1 1000 
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